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We evaluate the importance of “Limits to Arbitrage” to explain profitability of momentum strategies.
Specifically, when the availability of arbitrage capital is in short supply, momentum cycles last longer,
and breaks in momentum cycles are shorter.  We demonstrate the robustness of our findings with a
unique database of stock returns from1866-1907 London and the CRSP database. Momentum cycle
durations are similar in both databases and all other momentum facts documented in the literature
using the CRSP database hold for the Victorian period as well, except for the January reversal due
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Momentum strategies – buying winners and selling losers – have generated abnormal 
returns for over 160 years. We make use of recently collected historical data to document the 
returns to momentum investing in the CRSP era United States and the Victorian era London 
Stock Exchange. A consistently applied momentum strategy generated similar abnormal returns 
and profit cycles across both periods. We suggest an explanation for the both the persistence and 
cyclical nature of abnormal momentum profits. While buying winners and selling losers 
consistently generates abnormal returns, the momentum strategy does expose investors to large 
losses with enough regularity to limit leverage. We show that while the average return to the 
momentum strategy is high and uncorrelated with the market index, capturing these abnormal 
returns exposes the momentum investor to occasional sudden losses. We speculate that these 
losses make it difficult for sophisticated investors to consistently employ leverage with other 
people’s money. This “separation of brains from capital” can explain both the occasional large 
losses to the momentum strategy apparent in the time series of returns and why momentum 
continued to be a profitable strategy for 140 years. Sophisticated momentum traders subject to 
margin or capital constraints can exacerbate losses if forced to unwind positions at the end of 
profit cycles and this may impose a classic limit to arbitrage. 
The paper makes three contributions. First, we document that the momentum strategy has 
generated abnormal returns for over 140 years – using a new hand-collected data set of the 
London Stock Exchange during the Victorian era and comparing it with the Post 
Depression US. Second, we establish the fact that momentum portfolios have been subject to 
similar cycles since the 1860s. Third, we suggest a new approach to testing the sources of 
momentum cycles based on the duration dynamics of moment profit cycles. More specifically, 
we examine return distributions and the duration spells of momentum profit and losses from both 
eras. We test the underlying null hypothesis that the momentum portfolio returns and duration 
spells are drawn from the same distributions across eras. What then explains the persistence of 
momentum? We think the answer lies in the fact that while momentum portfolios do generate 
high returns orthogonal to market and business cycle risks, the momentum strategy also exposes 
investors to high variance and frequent losses. The frequent loses associated with momentum 
strategies make it difficult for investors who use other people’s money or leverage to drive 
momentum profits out of the market. This is the well known “limits to arbitrage” explanation of 
persistent anomalies. To test this formally, we introduce a new methodology based on modeling 3 
 
the duration dynamics as a function of the state of the economy, the market return and the 
scarcity of capital. If capital constraints limit arbitrage we would expect a measure of capital 
scarcity to predict the duration of cycles. We find strong evidence supporting this explanation of 
momentum cycles. 
We make use of our long times series of momentum profits to identify states in which the 
hazard of loss is high. A simple measure of the scarcity of investment capital – the risk-free rate 
– predicts the duration of momentum profit or loss cycles in both eras. We hypothesize that 
markets always have noise traders who buy and sell for idiosyncratic liquidity reasons or are 
subject to the biases in the literature. Profit opportunities from a simple momentum trading rule 
should depend on the relative supply of capital available to sophisticated and noise traders. Noise 
traders slow the adjustment of prices to new information and create opportunities for momentum 
traders. Time periods where investment capital is plentiful are also periods where the market is 
awash in sophisticated traders who find it easy to attract arbitrage capital and expand their 
positions. Momentum profits are therefore most likely to persist in periods where capital 
available to sophisticated momentum traders is in short supply relative to noise traders. This is 
the familiar story of rational but capital constrained traders. When investment capital is plentiful, 
the entry of sophisticated leveraged traders can quickly exhaust the profits from trading rules. As 
profits are exhausted and sophisticated traders post losses with more regularity, sophisticated 
traders exit and the profit opportunities return.  
Any duration based test of a trading strategy requires a large sample of observed cycles. 
A test based on the availability of arbitrage capital is best evaluated with an evaluation of a long 
time series rather than a cross-country comparison of momentum cycles. With increasing 
globalization, arbitrageurs in one country can exploit with ease profitable trading opportunities in 
other countries.  That makes it difficult to form country specific measures of arbitrage capital 
since capital can easily move across national borders and draws into question whether cross-
country cycles are independent observations. We therefore focus on the largest stock markets and 
establish the robustness of our findings by examining long time series. We therefore use CRSP 
era US stock market data and Victorian era London stock market returns to examine our 
hypothesis. 
In the paragraphs to follow, we review the literature and document the facts about risk, 
return and cyclicality of momentum portfolios during the CRSP and Victorian eras.  4 
 
 
A.  Stock Price Momentum during CRSP and Victorian Age: Cyclicality with 
Market States 
  We use a new hand-collected data set of the London Stock Exchange.
1 The new data 
set consists of the closing prices, dividends and shares outstanding of 1,808 stocks (equity) 
listed in London between 1866 and 1907. These stocks represent virtually every stock 
traded on the London Stock Exchange during this period. The fact that the London Stock 
Exchange was the most important market at the time, and that the U.K. was riding high on 
the waves of the second industrial revolution makes this a particularly interesting era to 
study as we cover a period of prosperity, expansion and the harbinger of twentieth century 
capitalism and financial markets. 
To the extent decision making biases are hardwired into the human psyche, we should 
expect to find price momentum in stocks even during the second industrial revolution. The 
London market during the Victorian age was, by today's standards, a primitive market with high 
execution costs, limited liquidity and very elementary computational power to sustain complex 
trading strategies. Even today's emerging markets may look quite advanced in comparison to 19
th 
century London, at least the know-how of trading and financial theory have made big leaps 
forward compared to what was available more than 100 years ago. Hence, if we did not find 
relative price momentum in stocks during the Victorian age, that would for instance cast doubt 
upon the behavioral explanations that rely on the psychology of decision making. 
The existence of price momentum during the Victorian age will not by itself rule out 
any one class of theories, but does eliminate the possibility that price momentum may be an 
artifact of data mining. Furthermore, to the extent that existing theories place out of sample 
restrictions on historical data, we can use our 19
th century sample to evaluate competing 
hypotheses. We find both statistically and economically significant momentum effects – 
short run reversal, medium term continuation, and long run reversal in past winners minus 
past losers portfolio returns – and the order of magnitude is quite similar to that of the 
                                                            
1 Historical data have been used before to assess some of the salient empirical stylized facts of asset returns.  
Most of these studies have focused on issues such as long term predictability, see e.g. for NYSE from 1815 to 
1925, as discussed in Goetzmann (1993) and Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng (2001) or the Brussels stock 
exchange as discussed in Annaert and Van Hyfte (2006). 
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widely documented end of 20
th century evidence. However, we do not find a particularly 
strong relationship between momentum profits and firm size and we do not find a distinct 
January effect in our data.
2  
An important defining characteristic of momentum profits we find is that 
momentum profits are cyclical. Figure 1 plots the time series of the Fama-French momentum 
factor returns from January 1946 to May 2008 and the return on a similarly constructed 
momentum factor during the Victorian era – based on the aforementioned new hand-collected 
data set described in detail later. When we compare the Post-War data with the Victorian era we 
observe the same cyclical pattern as well as momentum profits with roughly the same range of 
monthly gains/losses. The similarities are striking: Post-War momentum profits as measured by 
the one year moving average of past Winners minus past Losers returns exhibited negative 
episodes (i.e., vanished) once every 2 years with an average duration of 4.1 months per episode. 
During the period January 1867 to December 1907, momentum returns exhibited negative 
episodes once every 1.4 years with an average duration of 3.8 months per episode.
3 The time-
series of CRSP and historical era momentum profits resembles other rule-based trading strategies 
subject to the limits of arbitrage (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) – high average returns 
with enough periodic declines to prevent sophisticated leveraged investors from capturing 
profits without risk.
4   
We are not the first to notice cyclicality in momentum returns. Cyclicality is 
consistent with many behavioral explanations of momentum. One that makes testable 
predictions about observable historical returns is Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) 
(hereafter CGH). CGH note that the theory of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1997) 
(henceforth DHS) can be extended to predict differences in momentum profits across states of the 
market, like bull and bear markets, as aggregate overconfidence should be greater following 
                                                            
2 Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) carefully document the importance of tax-loss selling in momentum 
portfolios. The absence of a January effect in our Victorian data is not surprising as Victorians did not 
tax capital gains and the Victorian tax year did not end in December.  
3 Griffin,  Ji  and  Martin  (2004)  have  documented  similar  periodic  declines  in  other  nations  as  well.  
Figure  1 involves a one-year centered moving average. Hence, the moving average scheme produces some 
induced temporal dependence. As will be discussed shortly, the temporal dependence in momentum profits 
goes beyond that induced by smoothing. 
4 Gatev, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (2006) note that pairs trading - like momentum trading - features 
periodic breaks as well. Hence, momentum trading; pairs trading; and the like - i.e. certain rules of forming 
portfolios and liquidating portfolios - appear to work with random periodic breaks. 6 
 
market gains. Hence, CGH test whether momentum profits depend on market states. They find 
strong evidence that CRSP era momentum profits depend on the state of the market. We verify 
these findings in the Victorian era – momentum profits are higher following high long run 
(3-year) market returns and lower following low long run market returns – providing 
support of CGH.  
Momentum cycles may reflect changing risk over the business cycle. Chordia and 
Sivakumar (2002) [CS] show that macroeconomic instruments commonly used for measuring 
macroeconomic conditions can explain a large portion of momentum profits. CS argue that 
intertemporal variations in the macroeconomic risk factors are the main sources of momentum 
profits. After examining the data in a different way, CGH disagree the findings of CS. We find 
Victorian-era momentum profits are correlated with market state but unrelated to economic 
expansion and contraction cycles – and so the high returns to momentum strategies are 
difficult to reconcile as being compensation for macroeconomic risk.  
The historical fact that momentum cycles depend on past market returns and are 
likely to continue when the cost of investment capital is high suggests that these are times 
when “smart money,” i.e., the capital available to arbitrageurs, is in limited supply relative 
to available investment opportunities created by “dumb money,” i.e., capital available to 
investors whose behavior is subject to behavioral biases documented in the literature. It 
would appear that the limits of arbitrage discussed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) may be 
particularly binding following up markets, an empirical regularity in the data spanning over 
140 years. 
 
B.  Rest  of  the  paper 
Our main results – that momentum cycles are consistent across centuries and can be 
explained by a proxy for the availability of arbitrage capital – are presented in Section 4. 
Before we present our main findings, we first selectively review momentum literature in 
Section 2 and document the similarities between the Victorian and CRSP era momentum in 
Section 3. After establishing the similarities between eras, in Section 4 we formally test 
whether the momentum profit cycles during the Victorian era and those of the CRSP era 
share the same properties. Section 5 reports some measures of trading costs for the London 
market and Section 6 concludes the paper. Technical Appendices provide details about the 7 
 
unique data set and the new statistical procedures we apply to momentum duration cycles. 
 
II.  Related Literature 
 
In what follows we provide a selective survey of the literature, emphasizing only the 
findings relevant for the analysis in the current paper.
5 
Although several early empirical studies of the efficient market hypothesis examined 
relative strength strategies, there was little consensus regarding the profitability of such 
strategies. Levy (1967) claimed that buying stocks when their prices are substantially higher than 
their 27 weeks moving average resulted in superior profits. Jensen and Bennington (1970) 
challenged this claim by showing that Levy's trading rules did no better than buy and hold 
strategies suggesting that Levy's findings could be subject to a data mining bias. In contrast, 
Fisher Black (1973) found that Value Line rankings that relied, among other things, on relative 
strength (of the stocks in the industry relative to the composite stock index) had value. Grinblatt 
and Titman (1989) found that mutual fund managers exhibited a tendency to buy past winners – 
their buy decisions appeared to rely on the existence of price momentum. Lehmann (1990) used 
a clever portfolio strategy to exploit short run reversal and showed that it is an economically 
interesting phenomenon. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) examined the sources of momentum profits 
by analyzing Lehmann's (1990) portfolio strategy.
6 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) designed a clever trading strategy that we follow in this 
paper. Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) strategy relied on relative price momentum that was 
well defined and has been replicated by other researchers.
7 A vast number of studies have 
confirmed the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) finding using data from markets in a number of 
countries – United States, Europe, and emerging economies (see e.g. Rouwenhorst (1998)).
8 
Using a sample from 1973 until February 2008, Asness et al. (2008) study (value and) 
momentum in five major asset classes: (i) stock selection within four major countries, (ii) 
country equity index selection, (iii) government bond selection, (iv) currency selection, and 
                                                            
5 For a recent comprehensive survey of the literature, see e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2005).  
6 See Jegadeesh and Titman (2005) for a comprehensive survey of the momentum literature. 
7 Jegadeesh (1990) showed short term reversal and medium term continuation in returns in the cross section 
using regression methods. 
8 Chui,  Titman,  and  Wei  (2007)  note  that  Korea,  Japan,  and  Taiwan  are  exceptions. 
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(v) commodities. They provide ubiquitous evidence on the excess return to value and 
momentum, extending the existing evidence to government bonds, currencies and 
commodities. The consensus appears to be that there is reversal in the short run – i.e., past 
Winners lose relative to past Losers  during the first month following portfolio formation; 
continuation during the intermediate term – i.e., past Winners continue to win relative to past 
Losers during the 2 to 12 months following portfolio formation; and long run reversal – i.e., 
past Winners lose relative to past Losers over 36 to 60 months following portfolio formation. 
The evidence is stronger for short term reversal and intermediate term continuation. Korajczyk 
and Sadka (2004) show that momentum profits cannot be explained away by transactions costs. 
Given their estimates of visible and invisible transactions costs, find that the abnormal returns 
to some of the momentum strategies disappear only after about $5 billion of money chases 
them. 
A variety of explanations are offered for these relations. They range from data issues, 
such as microstructure and data snooping biases (Boudoukh et al. (1994), Conrad and Kaul 
(1989), Lo and MacKinlay (1988), to rational risk-based explanations (Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
Berk et al. (1999), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Bansal et al. (2002), to behavioral 
explanations of irrational behavior on the part of investors (DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), 
Hong et al. (2000), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), Grinblatt and Han (2002), among others). 
Several theories have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. They can be put into two 
classes: those that rely on investor psychology affecting stock prices and others that rely on the 
changing nature of real investment options available to firms. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1997) (henceforth DHS), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) (henceforth BSV), 
Hong and Stein (1999) (hereafter HS) and Grinblatt and Han (2005) (henceforth GH) are some of 
the notable papers falling in the former class. DHS assume overconfidence and self attribution – 
leads to momentum from overreaction that subsequently corrects resulting in reversal. BSV assume 
conservatism and extrapolation on the part of investors and show that will lead to continuation in 
the intermediate term and reversal in the long run. Hong and Stein assume slow information 
diffusion and positive feedback trading and show it can lead to momentum and subsequent 
reversal. GH argue that the tendency of some investors to hold on to their losing stocks, driven by 
“prospect theory” of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and “mental accounting” of Thaler (1980), 9 
 
can lead to slower diffusion of information and price momentum in stocks. The 
commonality among all these models is they all rely on biases in how investors process 
information. 
Berk, Green and Naik (1999) (BGN), Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004), 
Johnson (2002), Chen and Zhang (2007), and Sagi and Seasholes (2007) fall in the latter 
class. BGN pioneered the latter line of thinking by showing that when firms make optimal 
investment choices, their assets and investment options change in a predictable way 
affecting their life cycle risk characteristics and that can also cause price momentum in 
stocks. 
 
III. Momentum in the Victorian and CRSP Eras 
 
This study makes use of a new data set consisting of the closing prices, dividends and 
shares outstanding of 1,808 stocks (equity) listed in London between 1866 and 1907, compiled 
by the authors from late 19
th and early 20
th Century financial publications. As can be seen from 
Figure 2, the number of stocks we use to form momentum portfolios varies from 126 in 1866 to 
1074 in 1907. The number of stocks declines from 985 in 1903 to 544 in 1904, due to a number 
of industries vanishing from the quotation list, only to reappear in 1905. In Appendix A, we 
provide a detailed description of the unique and new hand-collected historical data. 
In this section, we document the similarities between momentum profits in the CRSP and 
Victorian Eras. One of the salient features of momentum in modern markets is that the return to 
momentum strategies varies with changes in formation and holding periods. We begin by 
verifying the similarity of risk and return at the intermediate term before comparing the term 
structure of CRSP and Victorian momentum profits.    
 
A.  Intermediate Term Momentum in Stock Prices 
The structure of this section follows that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), henceforth referred 
to as JT. It is worth recalling the trading strategies considered by JT. The main motivation is the 
premise that if stock prices either overreact or underreact to information, then profitable trading 
strategies that select stocks based on their past returns will exist. Therefore strategies examined 10 
 
by JT, consider selecting stocks based on their returns over the past 1 through 4 quarters. To 
increase the power of the tests, the strategies include portfolios with overlapping holding periods. 
Therefore, in any given month t, the strategies hold a series of portfolios that are selected in the 
current month as well as in the previous K - 1 months, where K is the holding period.
9 
Specifically, a strategy that selects stocks on the basis of returns over the past J months and holds 
them for K months is referred to as a J-month/K-month strategy. It is constructed as follows: At 
the beginning of each month t the securities are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their 
returns in the past J months. Based on these rankings, JT grouped stocks into deciles and formed 
a value-weighted portfolio of stocks within each decile. Since the number of stocks available to 
us during the Victorian age is smaller, we will work with a coarser grid, namely top, middle and 
bottom thirds – or small, medium and large. The top portfolio is called the “losers” and the 
bottom is called the “winners”. In each month t, the strategy buys the winner portfolio and sells 
the loser portfolio, holding this position for K months.
10  
Let us recall that JT used constructed momentum portfolio returns over the 1965 to 1989 
period using data from the CRSP daily returns. All stocks with available returns data in the J 
months preceding the portfolio formation date are included in the sample from which the buy 
and sell portfolios are constructed. Table 1, similar to Table I in JT, reports the average returns of 
the different buy and sell portfolios as well as the zero-cost, winners minus losers, portfolios 
constructed using our data set. JT have a larger set of 32 strategies, while our selection strategy is 
constrained by the smaller set of stocks and less frequent trading. JT find that the returns of all 
the zero-cost portfolios are positive and statistically significant except for the 3-month/3-month 
strategy. Our historical results reported in Table 1 are the same. The weakest case is the 3/3 
strategy, which is not statistically significant. 
The most successful zero-cost strategy in JT is the J=12/K=3 months strategy which yields 
1.31 % per month. Our most profitable strategies are also of the same type (J=13/K=3 and 
J=9/K=6 being quite similar) although they yield only .5 % per month. Moreover, the 9-month 
formation period produces returns of about .5 % per month regardless of the holding period. This 
                                                            
9 As noted at the beginning of section 2, we considered 28-day periods as months in our calculations. Moreover, 
when considering a year, i.e. K = 12 months in JT, we used 13 28-day periods. 
10 As mentioned earlier, if a stock, included in a momentum portfolio, vanishes from the database when the 
portfolio is formed, but does not reappear at any future point in time, we remove it. When a stock does 
reappear at a later time, we interpolate its price in computing the return on the momentum portfolio. 
 11 
 
is to be expected since we use a coarser partition of stocks based on past returns (tercile instead 
of decile as in JT). While the order of magnitude of monthly returns is less than half that reported 
in the JT paper, the statistical significance is about the same. 
To assess whether momentum strategy profits are abnormally high, it is necessary to examine 
their exposure to systematic risk. We follow the JT approach in focusing all our remaining 
analysis on the 6-month/6-month strategy, and thus in the rest of this paper the length of a period 
is 6 months. This has the advantage that we are dealing with equally spaced return observations, 
which makes the analysis of factor models and temporal dependence easier. 
Table 2 reports estimates of the two most common indicators of systematic risk, the post-
ranking betas of the 6-month/6-month relative strength portfolios and the average capitalizations 
of the stocks in these portfolios. The table is similar to Table 2 in JT, except for the fact that we 
have less entries due to the smaller set of strategies considered. We find, (similar to JT) that the 
beta of the zero-cost winners minus losers portfolio is negative (we find a beta of -0.02, whereas 
JT have a beta of -0.08), since the beta of the portfolio of past losers is higher than that of the 
portfolio of past winners. The average capitalizations of the stocks in the different portfolios 
show that the highest and the lowest past returns portfolios consist of smaller than average 
stocks, with the stocks in the losers portfolios being smaller than the stocks in the winners 
portfolio. This evidence is consistent with JT, suggesting positive risk adjusted returns on 
average for the momentum portfolio. 
Next, we examine the profitability of the 6-month/6-month strategy within subsamples 
stratified on the basis of firm size. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds. Panel A and 
B of Table 3 report average returns and Jensen's CAPM alphas, and Panel C reports CAPM 
regressions augmented with a NBER Business Cycle dummy.
11  
We note in Panel B of Table 3 that all the CAPM alphas are negative. A robustness 
check reported in Table 4 shows that this is due to our treatment of missing data. Recall 
that we set the last monthly return to -99.99 % whenever a firm vanishes from our sample 
                                                            
11 Consensus U.K. business cycle dates are not available for this time period. Therefore, we use NBER 
business cycle dates as proxies for the trans-Atlantic business cycle. However, there is considerable evidence 
that the U.S. and U.K business cycle was correlated during the Victorian era. U.S. and U.K. industrial 
production and per capita GDP had correlations of .22 and .25 respectively. Historical consumption data is 
unavailable but average U.K. household earnings grew at a rate of 1.55 % in years without NBER contractions 
and 1 % in years with an NBER contraction. See Officer (2008 a,b). 
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after portfolio formation. This grossly understates the actual returns. In Table 4, we 
compute returns under the alternative assumption that firms leave the database at random 
and do not set the last monthly return to -99.99%. This alternative method ignores the 
survivorship issue, as is done in JT. Under the alternative treatment of missing data, half 
the portfolios have positive alphas and half have negative alphas – as is found with modern 
era data. Thus, we can be confident that the negative CAPM alphas are due to our treatment 
of missing data. 
As JT note, measuring relative strength profits on size-based subsamples allows us to 
examine whether the profitability of the strategy is confined to any particular subsample of 
stocks. This analysis also provides additional evidence about the source of the observed 
relative strength profits. Table 3 presents the average returns of the 6-month/6-month strategy 
for each of the subsamples. The results we report are in line with JT. They indicate that the 
observed abnormal returns are of approximately the same magnitude when the strategies are 
implemented on the various subsamples of stocks as when they are implemented on the entire 
sample. Unlike JT, we do not find a particularly strong relationship with firm size. For the 
zero-cost, winners minus losers portfolio, JT find that the subsample with the largest firms 
generates lower abnormal returns than the other two subsamples. In Table 3, we find a large 
return for the medium-sized category, although the large firms in our sample still create the 
lowest return for the zero-cost, winners minus losers portfolio. When we control for the 
business cycle, we obtain similar findings, as discussed later. These findings indicate that the 
relative strength profits are not primarily due to the cross-sectional differences in the 
systematic risk of the stocks in the sample. 
Likewise, Table 5 reports the average returns of the zero-cost portfolio in January versus 
the rest of the year. JT note that following Roll (1983), there are reasons to expect that the 
relative strength strategies will not be successful in the month of January. They find that 
relative strength strategy loses about 7% on average in each January but achieves positive 
abnormal returns in each of the other months. We do not find such seasonal patterns, namely 
the month of January does not yield negative returns in our sample. Moreover, according to 
statistical tests reported in Table 5, there is, with a few minor exceptions, basically no 
difference between January and the other months of the year. Our findings essentially confirm 
the Roll (1983) story. With no capital gains taxes in our time period, we do not expect a January 13 
 
effect, as predicted by Roll (1983). 
To conclude, we examine again whether our choice of missing data treatment alter the results 
of the paper. In Table 6, we report the results we obtain for size-sorted average monthly returns 
and t-statistics for buy minus sell portfolios under our treatment of missing data and the results 
we would obtain if we relaxed our assumptions by either ignoring the extinction (don't set the 
last return to -99.99%) or ignoring all missing data by assuming it is missing completely at 
random (MCAR) and computing results from observable data only. Setting extinct stocks to -
99.99% obviously lowers gross returns but the relative comparisons of portfolios sorted by size 
or momentum are robust to the treatment of missing data. The t-stats are significant under all 
treatments of missing data. The results in Table 6 show that our decision to replace missing with 
-99.99% is in fact the most conservative. Moreover, the probability that a firm vanishes appears 
to be largely independent of past returns. While the actual magnitude of winner and loser alphas 
depends on the treatment of missing data, the alpha generated from a long winner short loser 
portfolio is robust to assumptions about missing firm returns. 
 
B.  Term structure of momentum returns 
Momentum profits can occur for a variety of reasons even from the perspective of someone 
who subscribes to the behavioral point of view. For example, if momentum profits are entirely 
due to slow diffusion of information, then the positive abnormal returns should decay over time 
to zero. On the other hand, if momentum profits are due to delayed overreaction, momentum 
profits will likely reverse in sign before decaying down to zero over time. We therefore examine 
the term structure of the profits to the various momentum portfolios in this section. 
We report in Table 7 the average monthly excess return on the momentum portfolios during 
each of the five years following portfolio formation, after skipping a month.
12 The  loser 
portfolios' returns almost double from year 1 to year 5. In contrast, the winner portfolios' returns 
come down somewhat by year 5. Therefore the difference, i.e., the winner minus loser 
momentum portfolio returns becomes negative in years 4 and 5, and marginally significant. As 
                                                            
12 It is important to note that the results in Table 7 are computed from all available time periods. This means 
the sample periods vary by column. For example the portfolio return in year 2 after formation is computed by 
looking at the buy-sell portfolio 14-26 months after formation, so our first “year 2” observation is July 1867-
June 1868. Our first “year 5” observation doesn't begin until July 1871, however. Therefore the Year 2 column 
has more observations than the Year 5 column. This is also why the various columns do not add up. 
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can be seen from Figure 4, a dollar invested in the 6 month Winner portfolio can be expected to 
grow steadily over time to 1.15 dollars in 5 years; and a dollar invested in the 6 month Loser 
portfolio can be expected to decline to 0.99 dollars after 19 months before rising to 1.08 dollars 
at the end of 5 years. The difference between the value of a dollar invested in each of the Winner 
and the Loser portfolios peaked at 7.7 cents on average by the end of the 3rd year before 
narrowing down to 6.1 cents at the end of 5 years (see Figure 5). So, while the evidence of long 
run reversal exists, it is not as dramatic as that reported in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). We can 
reject the hypothesis that momentum returns in years 2 to 5 are the same as that during year 1, in 
favor of the alternative that they are smaller at conventional levels of significance. 
Since our historical data is sampled every 28-days, therefore one year is 13 “months”. We 
wish to test the null hypothesis that the winner minus looser (WML) portfolio exhibits no 
momentum or reversal. We begin by forming a         matrix   where  the         ;           
element is equal to the month   annual return on the WML portfolio formed   years earlier. Let 
    ,   be the holding period return from month      12  to month   on the WML portfolio 
formed       13 “months” earlier. Under the null hypothesis that WML returns are independent 
of time since formation, each column of    should have the same expectation. We test this 
hypothesis by subtracting the year 1 WML return from the year 2, 3, 4 and 5 returns to form a 
new X    matrix such that X   ,          ,   1         ,1  :   Therefore X   ,    measures  the 
difference between the holding period return from month       12  to month t on the WML 
portfolio formed        1  years earlier and the WML portfolio formed        1   year  earlier.   
Under  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  momentum  or  reversal  X   ,     should  have expectation  
zero.  Table   8  reports  the  mean  return  of  the  WML  portfolio  1  through  5  years after 
formation. We test of the null that    X   ,        0           via a Wald test. 
13 The results in 
Table 8 show strong rejections of the null that average monthly returns are equal in years 1 
through 5. It is interesting to note the pattern of mean returns: 0.0034 after one year, 0.0016, 
0.0006 after two and three years and finally -0.0006 and -0.0015 after years four and five. This 
reaffirms the finding of short run reversal, medium term continuation, and long run reversal in 
past winners minus past losers portfolio returns. 
                                                            
13 More specifically, consider:       ∑  X   ,1   /    ,…,∑  X   ,4   /     ; then the test statistic is      
          , where under the null   ~    4 , asymptotically. Since the elements of X  are serially correlated, 
we use a HAC estimator for        using Newey-West with 13 lags. 15 
 
The  lower  panel  of  the  Table  shows  some  pairwise  test  results  and  we  note  that  year  
1  is significantly different from all other years. The average monthly returns after 2 and 3 years 
appear to have the same mean, and so do years 3 and 4 as well as 4 and 5. 
It should be noted that the above test may be biased by missing data. In particular, when an 
asset vanishes from our data set we set its return to -99.9% at the time of extinction and replace 
missing data with interpolated data when possible. However, we verified that the momentum in 




C.  The State of the Market, the Economy and Momentum 
Recall that Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) appeal to the theory of DHS to predict 
differences in momentum profits across states of the market, like bull and bear markets, as 
aggregate overconfidence should be greater following market gains (DHS and Gervais and 
Odean (2001)). With overconfidence higher following market increases, overreactions will be 
stronger following up markets, generating greater momentum in the short run. The HS model is 
also based on initial underreaction to information and subsequent overreaction, which eventually 
leads to stock price reversal in the long run. 
For each month, between 1929 and 1995, CGH denote the state of the market as Up (Down) 
if the markets trailing three-year return is positive (negative) on that date. They compare the 
returns of momentum portfolios formed during Up and Down markets and conclude that 
momentum was largely an up market phenomenon during the CRSP era. The London market 
index was seldom down in the 3-year windows during our historical sample period. We therefore 
take a slightly different definition of up and down markets. By CGH’s definition, 85 % of their 
observed market states were UP markets. We denote Victorian market states as follows Up = 
market index return over the past 3 years in the top 85 % of sample returns, and Down = market 
                                                            
14We did this as follows.  If survival rates differ across buy and sell portfolios this may bias our reversal tests. 
We evaluate the effect of missing data on the results in two ways. First we simply compute the probability of 
extinction. If the probability of extinction is independent of past return the momentum results should be robust 
to our choice of missing data treatment. We find survival probabilities that a stock remains in the data set, n-
months after formation, for buy and sell portfolios. The difference between survival rates in buy and sell 
portfolios is very small. We also computed the event time returns of WML portfolios under our treatment of 
missing data and an alternative MCAR treatment that simply ignores securities that vanish. If survival depends 
on past return the MCAR estimates should differ. Instead the MCAR results are statistically indistinguishable 
from our treatment of missing data. 16 
 
index return over the past 3 years in the bottom 15 % of sample returns. In Table  9 we report the 
evidence of momentum and market states in our sample and compare our results to CRSP era 
results computed with our sorting method. Recall that CGH sort stocks into deciles while we sort 
into terciles. The choice of tercile sorts instead of deciles, weakens the relationship between 
market state and momentum in the CRSP era but the difference between UP and DOWN market 
states, remains. 
Average profits and risk adjusted returns by market state are computed by taking the profits 
of each zero-cost momentum portfolio (winner minus loser terciles) for each formation date and 
averaging across all formation dates that qualify for a particular market state. The average 
monthly profit of the momentum portfolio formed at time   is: 
           ∑   
   
       /6                                                    (5.1) 
where    is the return of the 6-6 winner minus loser momentum portfolio formed at time  . We 
follow CGH and also report the average CAPM alpha across market states. The CAPM alpha of 
the momentum portfolio formed at time   is:  
      ∑   
   
               ,      ,   /6                                        (5.2) 
where      is the OLS estimator of a CAPM regression, using data from   1  to   6 . 
Table 9 reports the mean monthly profits and mean CAPM alphas by market state. 
The Up market average monthly profit is computed by taking the average of all         
for formation time t that corresponds to an Up market state. Down market results are 
computed in the same manner. Since the average returns are computed from overlapping 
holding periods, all t-stats are computed with the Newey and West (1987) HAC procedure 
using 5  
lags. 
CGH find that momentum profits depend on the state of the market, as predicted. From 
1929 to 1995, the mean monthly momentum profit following positive market returns is 0.93 % in 
their sample, whereas the mean profit following negative market returns is - 0.37 %. The up-
market momentum reverses in the long run. 
In Table 9 for the 6/6 winner minus loser portfolio, we find that the average monthly 
return following an Up market is 40 bp per month in the CRSP sample, and 38 bp per month in 
our sample. The corresponding numbers following a Down market are -28 bp per month and 15 
bp per month respectively. Momentum profits are higher following Up markets than Down 17 
 
markets in our sample just like in the CRSP sample but while the difference is statistically 
significant in the CRSP sample, it is not significant in our sample. We also find similar patterns 
for Jensen's alpha. 
Next, we examine whether commonly used macroeconomic instruments for measuring 
market conditions can explain a large portion of momentum profits, following the methods used in 
CGH. Following Chordia and Sivakumar (2002), we construct a factor model for expected returns:  
                                                                                    (5.3) 
where the return on the 6-6 momentum portfolio (i.e., Winner minus Loser monthly rate of 
return) is projected onto        : lagged dividend yield on the market index,      : lagged 
term spread [yield on British consol - yield on 30-day bankbill], and         : lagged default 
spread [yield on risky bonds (portfolio of British RR bonds) - yield on British consol].
15  
We use two methods to evaluate the ability of the factors to explain momentum 
profits. In Panel A of Table 10, we report the slope coefficients, the test statistic for the 
hypothesis that               0  and the proportion of variation collectively explained by 
the       ;       and          factors. The latter is obtained via the     of the CAPM 
residuals regressed on       ;       and        : For most 6-6 momentum portfolios, we 
can soundly reject the null that the betas on the macroeconomic factors are collectively equal 
to zero. It should be noted that CS use a 3 factor model with no market index. We add the 
market index for the regression that reports factor loadings and proportion of extra variation 
explained by CS's 3 factors (panel A of Table 10). In Panel B of Table 10, we sort on CS's 
three factors model (no market index). However, the proportion of variation explained by the 
macro factors is extremely small. Collectively, the macro factors explain less than 3% of the time 
series variation in portfolio returns and in the case of the largest stocks less than 0.3%. 
CGH employ a clever double sort methodology to illustrate the relative influence of 
momentum and factor premium on portfolio returns. For each stock and time period, they 
compute the factor loadings via an OLS regression over the trailing 60 months. With time   beta 
estimates in hand, they compute the expected return of each stock over the future 6 months given 
current betas and actual future realizations of the factors. They then sort stocks into portfolios 
                                                            
15 We computed the yields on the British consol and British railroad bonds from quotations in the Course of 
the Exchange. The yield on 30-day bank bills was collected from The Economist. 
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based on momentum and factor model expected return. We form historical portfolios via this 
method and report the results in Panel B of Table 10. Winner minus Loser portfolios within each 
of the three predicted return categories earn positive returns on average; the average returns are 
statistically (t-statistic of 3.75) and economically (54 bp per month) significant within the high 
predicted returns group. Further, within the Loser and Middle groups, stocks with high predicted 
returns earn lower returns than stocks with low expected returns, and they are jointly 
significantly different from zero. Hence, the findings with Victorian era data support the results 
of CGH, although our evidence appears somewhat weaker. 
 
D. Business Cycles and Momentum Profits 
During the Victorian age there were at least as many business cycles as in the current CRSP 
data; and the depressions of those days have been characterized as more severe.
16 We therefore 
examine how momentum profits are related to business conditions (expansions and contractions; 
as well as past stock market returns). To do so we turn our attention now to Tables 11 and 12. In 
Table 11, we report the results of the regression:  
                   
where    is the return on buy portfolio minus the return on sell portfolio and     is  the 
demeaned real per capita GDP growth. We examine this regression for small, medium and 
large stocks. In none of the cases do we observe any significantly positive exposure of the 
momentum profits to GDP growth rate risk; in fact the point estimates of the slope coefficient for 
GDP growth rate is negative for all size classes. 
To complement this, we also report in Table 12 a correlation matrix for the following 
variables: real per capita GDP growth, buy-sell portfolio annual returns for small, medium 
and large stocks, the average cross-sectional monthly stock return standard deviation, market 
excess returns and UK short and long-term rates obtained from Ordinary Funds. The 
correlations are computed using annual data. The first column of Table 12 shows that the 
annual returns of the buy-sell portfolio for small stocks features very negative correlations 
with GDP growth (around 30%), as well as the excess market returns and the long term rate. 
The medium-sized firms feature similar negative correlations except for the long rate which 
                                                            
16 There were 10 NBER recessions between 1866 and 1907 and 10 between 1946 and the present. 
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is positively correlated with buy-sell portfolio annual returns for medium firms (more than 
35%). Finally, the Buy-sell portfolio annual returns for large firms also show negative 
correlation with GDP growth, although the correlation monotonically declines with the size 
of the firms. 
 
IV. Momentum Cycles and Limits to Arbitrage 
 
So far we have established that the momentum strategy has generated abnormal returns 
for over 140 years. When a strategy as simple as buying past winners and selling past losers 
produces an almost free lunch, i.e., high returns on average with little or no systematic risk, we 
are left with several possibilities.  
First, for the Victorian and much of the CRSP era, investors may not have been aware of 
the existence of the almost free lunch. However, given the attention in the academic and trade 
literature it has received, investors will likely arbitrage away any future momentum profits. This 
does not appear to be the case. The average return on our WML portfolio since 1990 is actually 
higher than the return before 1990.  
Second, the almost free lunch may not exist. That is, the apparent high returns may 
be a spurious artifact of data mining that is unlikely to show up in future data. While a 
number of studies document the existence of price momentum in stocks in the United 
States and other countries, almost all of these studies use data from the same post World 
War II period and hence their findings cannot be viewed as being entirely independent of 
each other. Again, this is unlikely to be the case. Unlike cross-country comparisons, returns 
in Victorian England are independent of modern returns. This paper has increased the time 
series of available momentum returns by 50% without altering the abnormal returns. 
Third, the lunch may not be free. Momentum strategies may generate high returns on 
average but expose investors to low returns during severe economic contractions. Such 
business cycle risks may not be discernable by looking at the Post-War CRSP era data alone. If 
momentum portfolios expose investors to occasional severe real risks at business cycle 
frequencies we may need to observe returns in more than the handful of relatively benign Post-
War cycles before these risks become apparent. Historical Victorian age data helps us evaluate 20 
 
this hypothesis by observing momentum returns across several business cycles of varying 
levels of severity. Recessions were both more frequent and more severe during our Victorian 
era sample period. The NBER business cycle chronology includes 10 troughs during the 42 
years between 1866 and 1907 compared to 10 troughs in the 63 years since World War II.
17 
The cycles were more severe as well. The standard deviation of annual per capita UK GDP 
growth was 4.5% between 1866 and 1907 and 3% between 1946 and 2007 (see Johnston and 
Williamson (2008)); yet the momentum profits persist. 
What then explains the persistence of momentum? We think the answer lies in the cycles 
apparent in Figure 1. While momentum portfolios do generate high returns orthogonal to market 
and business cycle risks, the momentum strategy also exposes investors to high variance and 
frequent losses. Momentum trading involves active trading by relatively sophisticated investors. 
If many well capitalized sophisticated investors followed momentum strategies at the same time 
we would expect their collective action to squeeze the profit out of the strategy. The frequent 
loses associated with our momentum strategy makes it difficult for investors who use other 
people’s money or leverage to drive momentum profits out of the market.  
The WML momentum portfolio is self-financing but traders would have to post margin 
against losses. The lag-6, hold-6 WML portfolio suffered drawdowns of 10% or more once every 
3.4 years during the CRSP era. These drawdowns were quick – lasting only 4.5 months on 
average – and sharp – the WML portfolio lost an average of 17.5% per drawdown. Most 
professional money managers who rely on investors for financing cannot lose one third of their 
capital in a few months time without being driven out of business by redemption requests. Given 
the frequent drawdowns in the WML portfolio any money manager employing even 2:1 leverage 
would be unlikely to last more than a handful of years. This is the well known “limits to 
arbitrage” explanation of persistent anomalies. Momentum strategies look like winners for 
unlevered investors, but without leverage the number of sophisticated investors must be large 
relative to noise traders before the anomaly vanishes. In models such as Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) rational but capital constrained investors can generate cycles if losses in the WML 
portfolio force momentum investors to unwind positions to meet liquidation requests. In 
such a setting momentum profits depend on the relative supply of capital to noise and 
                                                            
17 The NBER business cycle chronology is for the U.S. No NBER equivalent exists for the U.K. but the U.K. 
and U.S. business activities were highly correlated during the Victorian Age. 21 
 
arbitrage traders. Momentum profits will be high when times are good and plentiful noise 
traders provide profit opportunities or when arbitrage capital is scarce and few sophisticated 
traders compete.    
If volatility limits arbitrage, we should observe cycles in momentum and be able to predict 
when momentum profits will vanish. In this section, we examine the cyclicality of the WML 
returns and formally test whether momentum profit cycles from the Victorian and CRSP eras 
share the same features and are predictable by the same variables.  
We test these hypotheses in two ways. First, we establish the fact that momentum portfolios 
have been subject to similar cycles since the 1860s. We examine return distributions and the 
duration spells of momentum profit and losses from both eras. We test the underlying null 
hypothesis that the momentum portfolio returns and duration spells are drawn from the same 
distributions across eras. Second, we model the duration dynamics as a function of the state of 
the economy, the market return and a measure of scarcity of capital. If capital constraints limit 
arbitrage, we would expect a measure of capital scarcity to predict the duration of cycles.  
We start with the momentum return distribution during both the Victorian and CRSP eras and 
test whether the momentum return is white noise for both eras. Before we estimate AR 
coefficients, we need to remind the difference in data structure between eras – four weeks for the 
Victorian era and one month for the CRSP era. Thus, ρ    of the Victorian era should be 
compared with  ρ   of the CRSP era. So, we restrict our attention on ρ  to k   1,2,…,6 for 
monthly data and to k   1,2,…,4   for quarterly data. Table 13 shows the estimated 
autocorrelations and t-stats.  The Ljung-Box test in Table 14 shows the p-value for the null that 
ρ   0  for all k. The Box-Pierce test in Table 14 shows the p-value for the null that ρ 
V          
ρ 
CRSP for all k. For monthly data, we can reject that ρ   0  for all k for the CRSP era with 95% 
confidence level. And, for quarterly data, we can reject that ρ   0  for all k for both eras with 
95% confidence level. Furthermore, for both monthly and quarterly data, we cannot reject the 
null that ρ 
V          ρ  
CRSP for all  k. Hence, the momentum returns are different from white 
noise and both eras share the same AR features.  
Next, we look at duration spells. We construct the sequence of duration spells for each era. 
For example, if the monthly series of momentum profit is (0.01, -0.04, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, -0.02, -
0.02), the sequence of duration up is (1,3) and the sequence of duration down is (1,2). We apply 
this method for both eras and get 133 observations for the Victorian era and 224 observations of 22 
 
CRSP era. Table 15 summarizes the empirical distribution of duration spells for both periods. 
We can see that empirical distributions are roughly similar.  
Suppose we call the sequence of duration up (down) duration spell D U D D  and we want to 
test the null hypothesis that: H : D X ~ F,  for all i during the Victorian and CRSP eras for 
X     U or D, where F  is some duration distribution. We essentially adopt two strategies in 
testing this null hypothesis. The first is a non-parametric approach, where we do not explicitly 
specify a duration distribution. The second is parametric, and relies on a specific parametric 
distribution. Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages. The non-parametric approach 
has the obvious advantage that we do not have to select a distribution for the duration spells, 
whereas the parametric approach not only tests the null hypothesis of equality across the two 
eras, but also whether we actually selected a distribution that properly describes the duration 
spells. Hence, the parametric approach tests a joint hypothesis, the null of identical duration 
distributions and the null that the chosen duration distribution F is correctly specified. In 
contrast, the non-parametric approach – while distribution-free – requires the duration spells to 
be i.i.d. Since, we examine the sequence of up/down durations, this may not be an unreasonable 
assumption. Moreover, the non-parametric tests typically are less powerful, as are many non-
parametric tests, each having particular power properties again violations of the null hypothesis. 
For the non-parametric tests we consider four tests, they are (a) the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon 
test, (b) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, (c) Cramer-von Mises test, and (d) Kuiper test. The Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test is that the two samples are drawn from a single population, and therefore 
that their probability distributions are equal – although it is sometimes referred to as a test of 
equal medians. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) and Cramer-von Mises test statistics quantify a 
distance between the empirical distribution functions of the two era samples. The null 
distribution of these statistics is again calculated under the null hypothesis that the samples are 
drawn from the same distribution. Finally, the Kuiper test is a variation of the K-S test that is 
more sensitive to tail behavior. Details about the tests appear in Appendix B. In Table 16, we 
report the results of the aforementioned tests. Entries to the table are p-values for the null 
hypothesis that the duration spells during the Victorian and CRSP eras are drawn from the same 
population.  23 
 
The results are fairly easy to summarize. Overall we find overwhelming evidence in favor of 
the null hypothesis that both eras feature duration spells that come from the same distribution. 
The distribution of momentum cycles has remained similar since the 1860s. 
In our parametric tests, we have to select an explicit distribution for the durations. We 
consider the following distributions: (a) the exponential, (b) Gamma, (c) Weibull. In Figure 6, 
we plot the empirical duration up distribution against the three aforementioned functional forms 
of duration distributions. In Figure 7, we plot the empirical duration down spell distribution 
against the three aforementioned functional forms of duration distributions. Clearly, the 
exponential distribution inadequately describes the data, whereas the other two are more 
plausible. When we estimate the latter two, we find parameter estimates that are roughly the 
same across the two eras. In Table 17, we report the Maximum Likelihood estimates and 
standard errors. We also tested whether the parameters across the two eras are identical and 
cannot reject the null that they are equal (details available upon request). 
We are confident that the momentum strategy generates similar return and duration 
distributions in both eras. The question remains: can we explain momentum? We hypothesize 
that the observed cycles are caused by changes in the relative supply of capital available to 
sophisticated momentum traders and noise traders. We predict that a measure of the scarcity of 
capital will affect the likelihood of duration spells. Specifically, we use the real risk-free rate as a 
proxy for the scarcity of capital. When the risk-free rate is high we expect the capital available to 
momentum traders to be in short supply and the cost of leverage to be high. With relatively few 
sophisticated traders competing for momentum profits we expect profit (UP) cycles to last longer 
and loss cycles (DOWN) to be shorter. Thus, we expect the real risk-free rate to effect the 
duration of returns in different directions depending on whether we are in an UP or DOWN 
cycle. This is one possible explanation on momentum cycle through the demand effect. 
One the other hand, we can think about naïve investors as liquidity providers. As the funds 
from naïve investors increase, the sophisticated momentum traders may prolong momentum 
profits. This is another explanation on momentum cycle through the supply effect. We use past 
stock returns as a proxy of the size of naïve investors. Note that, in Table 9, we showed that the 
momentum profits are significantly high after UP markets. There is also a demand effect, the 
willingness of sophisticated investors to sustain momentum strategies. In line with the previous 
empirical analyses, we estimate duration distributions with state variables. Specifically, we 24 
 
model the parameters in the Weibull and Gamma distributions as   e x p                         
 ′                 with the risk-free rate, and the stock market state as covariates. The details 
of the procedure appear in Appendix B. Under both parametric assumptions, the expected 
duration is inversely related to  . Thus, the positive (negative) sign of   can be interpreted as the 
positive (negative) relationship between state variables and durations.  
The results are reported in Table 18. As predicted the point estimate on the risk-free rate has 
a positive effect on the duration of UP cycles and a negative effect on the duration of DOWN 
cycles. Regardless of specification, the point estimates always have the predicted sign although 
often insignificant from zero – particularly for impact of past market returns on momentum 
durations. In Table 19 we formerly test the null hypothesis that the level of the risk-free rate 
differs across UP and DOWN cycles. We test this hypothesis by pooling the UP and DOWN 
cycles and allowing the all coefficients to vary with an interaction dummy equal to one if the 
observation is a DOWN cycle. Regardless of era or specification, the effect of the risk-free rate is 
always significantly lower in DOWN cycles. Hence, when capital is plentiful, the probability of 
momentum traders suffering losses is significantly lower than when capital is scarce.  
 
V. Trading Costs 
 
In Tables 20 and 21, we turn our attention to transaction costs. It is indeed worth 
investigating how costly it would be to sustain a momentum strategy. Korajczyk and Sadka 
(2004) find that several momentum strategies may not implementable on a large scale when 
transactions costs are taken into account. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) find that those 
stocks that generate large momentum returns are precisely the stocks with high trading 
costs. Both studies use data, such as intraday data, which is not available in our historical 
period. We therefore use a simpler approach to gauge the importance of trading costs 
associated with momentum portfolios. 
Table 21 provides data on average bid-ask spreads and average prices of stocks in 
each of the portfolio categories, whereas Table 20 displays the transition probabilities 
pertaining to portfolio turnover. Regarding the latter, each cell in the matrix contains the 
proportion of times that a stock in a given portfolio at time t lands in a given portfolio at time 
    1: With respect to trading costs we are most interested in the diagonal values which 25 
 
tell us the proportion of times a stock remains in the same portfolio during a new formation. The 
persistence of stock assignment is generally in the 30-35% range, which is fairly high compared 
to current momentum strategies (see e.g. Conrad and Kaul (1998)). 
Table 21 also reports the value-weighted bid-ask spread as a percentage of the 
midpoint for all stocks that are assigned to each portfolio at each date. For example, when 
the Large Buy portfolio's spread is .02, it means that the value-weighted average bid-ask 
spread of all stocks purchased or sold from the Large Buy portfolio was 2% of the midpoint 
of their bid-ask price. To get an idea of transaction costs, it should be noted that the average 
bid-ask spread of the Large Buy portfolio was .02. We know that only 1/6 of the portfolio is 
replaced each period so dividing by 6 .02/6 = .0033. This is the average per period 
transaction cost if one paid the full bid-ask spread and bought and sold every stock in the 
new and old portfolios. However, some of the stocks in the new portfolio were also in the 
portfolio we formed 6 months ago. From the transition matrix in Table 20, we see that on 
average 32 % of the stocks in the Large Buy portfolio at any time are also in the same 
portfolio 6 months later. We would therefore only have to turn over 68 % of the stocks. 
Multiply .0033 by .68 to get the final back of the envelope estimate of bid-ask costs of 
roughly 23 basis points per period. This turns out to be the lowest cost. For the other 
portfolios the costs can be as high as 229 basis points (Small Loser). Hence, these rough 
measures show that trading costs are high, at least as much as they are in recent history, 
which makes the profits of momentum not realizable except to those who were making a 




Among financial market anomalies, price momentum in stocks is generally viewed as 
posing the greatest challenge to rational asset pricing theories.   Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
proposed that anomalies like momentum could persist due to the limits to arbitrage imposed by 
slow movements of capital available to arbitrageurs.  The limits to arbitrage arguments imply 
that when arbitrage capital is in short supply profitable momentum cycles should last longer and 
breaks in momentum cycles should be shorter. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis 
by using the level of the interest rate as a proxy for the shortage of available arbitrage capital. 26 
 
With increasing globalization, arbitrageurs in one country can exploit with ease profitable 
trading opportunities in other countries.  That makes it difficult to measure shortage of arbitrage 
capital, since capital can easily move across national borders.  We therefore focus on the US 
market, since the US is a much larger economy than other countries in the world and if the level 
of the interest rate were to proxy for shortage of arbitrage capital, we should expect it to hold 
better in the US.  We therefore use US stock market data for the 1926 - 2008 period to examine 
our hypothesis. 
Since the level of the interest rate is a poor proxy for the shortage of arbitrage capital, we 
examine the robustness of our conclusions by checking the validity of our hypothesis using data 
from an entirely different period of history.  We use a new hand-collected data set of the London 
Stock Exchange which consists of the closing prices, dividends and shares outstanding of 1,808 
stocks (equity) listed between 1866 and 1907 (Victorian age). By today's standard, the market 
was very primitive – and therefore presented an interesting case to examine price 
momentum.  We find strong support for our hypothesis in both the 1926-2008 US stock market 
data as well as the Victorian age data.  In addition, the histogram of the lengths of profitable 
momentum cycles and breaks in momentum cycles in the two periods are about the same. 
When we replicate the trading strategy designed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) using 
Victorian age data, we find compelling evidence for short term reversal, intermediate term 
continuation and long run reversal in momentum profits.  Momentum profits are low following 
three year down markets and high following three year up markets; and they do not appear to be 
compensation for economy wide systematic risk, captured by the standard CAPM or 
macroeconomic factor models.  They are higher during economic contractions, a pattern that is 
different from the post World War II period. Our finding of price momentum during the 
Victorian age eliminates the possibility that price momentum may be an artifact of data mining. 
That is the systematic pattern across data spanning several centuries and is consistent 
with explanations based on overconfidence and an abundance of noise traders relative to 
availability of arbitrage capital. The defining characteristics of momentum – its cyclicality – is 
not related to GDP but is predictably linked to the level of the real risk-free rate. The theoretical 
literature emphasizes the role of “dumb money” and “limits of arbitrage” in explaining price 
momentum in stocks. Conventional wisdom is that relative abundance of dumb money is 
typically associated with sustained periods of up markets and low interest rates leading to asset 27 
 
bubbles that will be difficult to burst even for arbitrageurs with very deep pockets.  Our findings 
suggest that “dumb money” may be abundant relative to “smart money” even during periods 
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A.   The  London  Stock  Market  Data:  1866-1907 
 
The closing bid and ask prices were collected from the quotation list of The Money Market Review, a weekly 
financial paper published in London between 1860 and 1908. Published on Saturdays, The Money Market Review 
reprinted H.H. Wetenhall's official quotation list of the previous Friday's closing prices. These were the official 
prices published by the Committee of the Stock Exchange under the name “Course of the Exchange”. The data was 
sampled every 28-days rather than the more traditional end of month observations, due to the newspaper’s weekly 
publication schedule. 
 
The official list was organized by industry and asset type. The list begins with British government debt, then 
lists foreign government debt, British, Commonwealth and foreign railroads and concludes with commercial 
securities organized by industry (banks, breweries, canals & docks, insurance, iron coal & steel, gas, mining, 
shipping, spinning, waterworks, tea, land, financial & investment trusts and miscellaneous securities). The Money 
Market  Review's list is not complete. Some industries do not appear on certain dates and within industries 
individual stocks may have no price for one or more dates. When possible, we filled in the missing price data 
with The Economist's “Stock Market Prices Current”. The Economist 's price list included only the largest and 
most active securities listed in London. Since its coverage was sparse, we only employ the Economist to fill in 
data that was missing from the The Money Market Review. If a section of the official list was omitted from a 
given Money Market Review, we attempted to replace the missing data with quotes from the Economist. 
 
The data set contains 610,421 bid and ask prices. To minimize entry time and assure quality, the data was 
double entered by undergraduate research assistants. As a consequence of our data entry strategy, a stock must 
appear on the official list for at least one January before it is included in the data set. 
 
The official lists did not differentiate between equity and debt. Today, one would assume that an economist and 
trained historian would have no problem distinguishing a stock from a bond, but in the 19
th Century the difference 
between debt and equity was seldom obvious. The 19
th Century English publications generally referred to both debt 
and equity claims as “stocks”. A careful examination of the claims each class of shareholder enjoyed, usually 
allowed us to determine if a given security was a debt or equity claim. When selecting which securities to include in 
our data set, we excluded all securities with fixed interest rates, a face value to be returned at a maturity date or other 
obvious characteristics of bonds. 
 
In general, London securities were divided into the following types of asset classes: “stocks”, “shares”, 
“ordinary”, “common”, “limited”, “deferred”, “preference”, “debenture” and “convertible” shares. Whether, the 
name of the share corresponded to what a modern investor would consider equity depended upon the type of 
company in question. We looked at each potential security and excluded every security with characteristics similar 
to modern day debt. “Common”, “limited”, and “ordinary” shares were almost always the residual claimants and 
therefore correspond to modern day equity. “Stock” on the other hand, was the name given to 19
th Century bonds! 
“Preference”, “debenture” and “convertible” shares were also excluded, while “deferred” shares generally referred 
to debt offerings with one notable exception, the investment trusts. Many investment trusts issued only three types of 
shares, “preference”, “debenture” and “deferred”. Debenture and preference shares had a fixed dividend rate and 
often had a maturity date at which time the nominal amount (face value) of the share would be returned. Deferred 
shares in investment trusts, on the other hand, were generally the residual claimant to all income in excess of the 
debenture and preference obligations. We include the deferred shares of investment trusts in our data, provided the 
trust has no ordinary shares and the deferred shares satisfy our conditions of no maturity date and no cap on 
dividends. 
 
For each January, a list of all securities was compiled, meeting our definition of equity. This list of security 
names and copies of the subsequent year's quotation lists, were distributed to research assistants. To eliminate typos 
each date was double entered by different research assistants and then compared. Therefore, to appear in the data set, 
a stock had to appear on the official quotation list for at least one January. 
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In addition to the closing prices, we collected dividend payments and shares outstanding, for each security. 
These allow us to compute market values and 28-day holding period returns that accurately reflect dividend 
payments and stock splits. In total, the data set consists of 610,421 bid and ask prices and 39,090 dividend 
payments. The dividend payments were collected from the security lists of The Investor's Monthly Manual
18 . The 
Investor's Monthly Manual (IMM) published the monthly closing price, shares outstanding and last four dividends 
of each security, listed on the London Stock Exchange. We use the IMM to collect dividend and share histories for 
each security that appears in our data set. Like The Money Market Review, certain securities vanish from the IMM 
and reappear at a later date without explanation. 
 
 
A1. Capital  Calls  and  Returns 
 
We use the price and dividend data to compute the 28-day holding period return for each consecutive price 
observation. The 28-day holding period gross return is defined as              /   where      and    are  the 
average of the bid and ask prices at time     1 and   respectively, and    is the net dividend payments and capital 
calls (if any) that occurred between time   and       1 . Capital calls are a form of reverse dividend common to 19
th 
Century stock exchanges. 
 
Many 19
th Century companies issued shares with a nominal value known as the “amount”. The company typically 
did not require the shareholders to pay for the entire share at the time of issue. Instead, shares were issued with a 
“par” or “paid” value that was less than the nominal amount of the share. Dividends were based on the par value of 
the share and not the nominal amount. For example, if a company with a £100 share with £50 paid announced a 10% 
declared dividend, this would amount to £5 rather than £10: 
 
The shareholder was legally obligated to pay the remaining capital (the difference between the nominal and paid 
amount) at the whim of the company. Thus the company could “call” upon its shareholders to pay for the remaining 
value of their shares. This call was apparently binding, as the shares in many bankrupt companies with par values 
less than nominal amounts traded at negative values when the implicit short put option embedded in the shares was 
worth more than the company's equity. 
19 To compute holding period returns, we treat capital calls as a negative 
dividend paid at the beginning of the holding period. 
 
A2. Data  Limitations 
 
Historical data provides both a new laboratory to evaluate theories as well as a unique set of challenges. Missing 
observations are far more common in historical data. There are three types of missing data. Firstly, there are securities that 
vanish because the company goes out of business. Secondly, there are securities that are not quoted for a period and then 
re-appear without explanation. Finally, there are dates when the newspapers omit an entire industry from the price lists. 
 
The first case is the well known problem of survivorship bias. Securities do not vanish from the price list 
at random. Instead, the companies with poor returns and low stock prices are far more likely to go bankrupt and 
vanish. Two characteristics of our data mitigate the potential survivorship bias. To begin with, very few securities 
simply “vanish”. When a security disappears from our price list we generally observe its decline to zero (or 
negative) price before it is removed from the list. When a security vanishes we make every attempt to discover 
what happened to the company and compute the final holding period return. If the security vanished due to 
reorganization, liquidation or merger, the IMM often lists the details and we correct the last return to reflect these 
events. 
 
The second and third cases of missing data are more troublesome. These are cases of securities that do not 
go out of business, but are merely omitted from the price list on a given day. If prices are missing completely at 
random, the analysis that follows can easily be altered to accommodate the missing observations. If the probability 
                                                            
18 The IMM is available online at  http://som.yale.edu/imm/html/index.shtml 
19 We only include stocks with positive values in the analysis that follows. 
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of observing a given return is correlated with the value of that return, however, the missing values will bias our 
estimates. 
 
In the computations to follow, we form our momentum portfolios using actual prices available to Victorian 
era investors. We base all buy and sell decisions on actual price data. Once a portfolio is formed, however, we 
compute its post-formation return from observable prices if possible and interpolate data if necessary. 
 
When necessary, we replace missing prices with interpolated data via the following algorithm. If a security 
vanishes from the quotation list we look ahead to the next date that a quotation is available. If the security reappears 
N-periods in the future, we compute the N-period gross return and convert it to a 1-period return by taking the gross 
return to the (1/N)th power. We replace all missing 1-period returns with this interpolated return. For example, if a 
security's price is last observed at time t and reappears 20% higher at time t+5 we replace the missing values at time 
t+1 to t+5 with (1.2)
(1/5) : When computing multiperiod returns we assume all dividends are paid at the end of the 
period. 
 
If a stock vanishes and does not reappear for one year we set its return to -99.99 %. Setting all extinct 
stocks to -99.99 % return surely understates the true return. However, the nature of the conclusions we obtain 
do not change if we relax our assumptions by either ignoring the extinction (don't set the last return to -
99.99%) or ignoring all missing data by assuming it is missing at random and computing results from 
observable data only. Setting extinct stocks to -99.99% obviously lowers gross returns but the relative 
comparisons of portfolios sorted by size or momentum are robust to the treatment of missing data - as will be 
discussed in detail later. Finally, it should be noted that we do not have enough industries during the Victorian age 
to examining the importance of industry momentum identified by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999). 
 
B. Duration Analyses and Tests 
B1.  Nonparametric tests 
Duration spells of up and down momentum cycles are tested for equality across the Victorian and CRSP 
eras in Table 16. The test statistics are: are  (a) the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) test, (b) Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, (c) Cramer-von Mises test, and (d) Kuiper test Entries to the table are p-values for the null hypothesis 
that the duration spells during the Victorian and CRSP eras are drawn from the same population. We provide a short 
description of the tests in this section. 
The MWW test is for chances of obtaining greater observations in one population versus the other. The null 
hypothesis in the Mann–Whitney test is that the two samples are drawn from a single population, and therefore that 
their probability distributions are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that one sample is stochastically greater. It 
requires the two samples to be independent. In a most general formulation, the test may be thought of as testing the 
null hypothesis that the probability of an observation from one population     exceeding an observation from the 
second population     is 0.5:            0.5 versus           0 . 5 ,          0 . 5 ,                0 . 5  in an 
alternative hypothesis. The test involves the calculation of a statistic, usually called U (U-statistic is due to 
Hoeffding (1948)) whose distribution under the null hypothesis is known – in samples of moderate size it is 
normally distributed.  
While the MWW is based on ranks, the next statistic, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (K–S test) is a form of 
minimum distance estimation used in our case to compare two samples (two-sample K–S test). The Kolmogorov–
Smirnov statistic quantifies a distance between the empirical distribution functions of two samples – in our case 
duration spells across two eras. It has a non-standard asymptotic distribution based on a Brownian bridge. The 
Cramer-von Mises test is also based on distance measures between empirical (duration) distributions, yet it involves 
a different metric – namely a    rather than Sup norm in the case of the K-S test. Finally the Kuiper test is also 
closely related to the K-S test but distinguishes the maximum deviation above from the one below of the two 
cumulative distributions being compared. 35 
 
B2. Parametric Analysis 
We explain how the estimates and the tests reported in Tables 17 through 19 are computed. Let   denote a 
random variable of duration for positive or negative momentum profits. For Table 17, let    ,   denote the 
probability density function of   with the parameter (vector)  . For the exponential distribution,    ,           . 
For the Gamma distribution,    , ,    
            
Г    . And, for the Weibull distribution, 
   , ,                          
.  We can use the maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of interest.  
 
Given a sample of duration of        
   , we compute the log likelihood of sample as 
  θ  ∑ log    
        ,   . Then, the ML estimates of   are computed from  
                    θ . 
Let   denote the dimension of  . For the exponential distribution,   1 , for the Gamma and the Weibull 
distributaion,   2 .  Standard errors of     are obtained from the diagonal elements of       . The (i,j) element of 
     is  
     ,       
  
       
log    ,   |  , 





         ι    ι             ι    ι  
2   





where   is set as 10   and ι  is a   -dimensional vector of zero except i-th component of 1. After approximating the 
  -by-   matrix of       as the above, we take the diagonal elements of the inverse matrix of               to get the 
standard errors of    .  For Table 18, we first apply a 3 month MA filter to all the data, including momentum profits 
and calculate momentum durations and the corresponding state variables.  
 
Next, we keep duration data above 3 months and we estimate parameters and standard errors of an 
accelerated failure time (AFT) model which takes the form  
     exp     , 
where   is the duration,    is the baseline failure time which follows the baseline distribution,   is a vector of 
explanatory variables, and   is the parameter vector. We assume    follows the Gamma distribution or the Weibull 
distribution with  =1. Let    , ,   denote the density of duration   with the state variable of  . Under the Gamma 
distribution, the density of    with explanatory variables of   is 
   , , ,    
            
Г   
. 
And, under the Weibull distribution, that is 
   , , ,                          
. 
 
Here, we set      e x p                          . Note that the dimension of   is   4   with our baseline 
model and the specification of AFT. Given a sample of duration of        
   and state variables of        
  , we 
compute the log likelihood of sample as   θ  ∑ log    
        ,   ,   .  We use again ML to estimate the models. 
 
From the estimates of    for Victorian era with a Gamma distribution, we can infer that a 1% increase in 
the level of     will induce 40% increase of the average duration time.  Table 19 shows the difference of the effects of 
state variables across UP and DOWN cycles. To test this formally, we pool the duration data as    ,        
   for 
each era.     is a down dummy variable which is 1 if the cycle is down and 0 otherwise. Under the Gamma 
distribution, the density of    with explanatory variables of   and the down dummy    is 
   ,  , , , ,    ,       
             
Г    
. 
And, under the Weibull distribution, that is 
   ,  , , , ,    ,                            
. 36 
 
Here, we set      e x p                                   ,       ,          ,          ,                  and 
               . Note that the dimension of   is   4   under given parametric assumptions and the specification 
of AFT. We use the same method as in table 18 for estimating parameters and the standard errors of those. The 




Table 1: Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios - Short horizons 
London Stock Exchange 1866-1907 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed on J-month lagged returns and held for K months. The values of J and K for the 
different strategies are indicated in the first column and row respectively. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 
J-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is the buy portfolio. t-statistics are between 
parentheses. As noted at the beginning of section 2, we considered 28-day periods as months in our calculations. Moreover, when 
considering a year, i.e. K = 12 in Jegadeesh and Titman, we used 13 28-day periods. 
 
J  skip 
month 
K 
3 6 9  13 
3 Buy 
-0.0046  0.0001 0.0016 0.0019 0.0023 
(-2.6500)  (0.0020) (1.4428) (1.8167) (2.4009) 
3 Sell 
0.0020  0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 
(1.4300)  (0.0001) (-0.2643) (0.0389) (0.1415) 
3 Buy-Sell 
-0.0066  0.0001 0.0019 0.0018 0.0022 
(-3.3800)  (0.0019) (1.8938) (2.1452) (3.0538) 
6 Buy 
-0.0017  0.0018 0.0026 0.0030 0.0032 
(-1.1800)  (1.5419) (2.3060) (2.8644) (3.2670) 
6 Sell 
0.0009  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0000 
(0.6000)  (-0.6585) (-0.6817) (-0.6093) (-0.0161) 
6 Buy-Sell 
-0.0026  0.0027 0.0034 0.0038 0.0032 
(-1.4800)  (2.0877) (2.9693) (3.6612) (3.6469) 
9 Buy 
-0.0004  0.0026 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 
(-0.3100)  (2.1190) (3.0610) (3.2159) (3.4521) 
9 Sell 
0.0000  -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0006 
(-0.0200)  (-1.3453) (-1.2881)  (-0.983)  (-0.4663) 
9 Buy-Sell 
-0.0004  0.0049 0.0054 0.0048 0.0040 
(-0.2500)  (2.8105) (3.7652) (3.7538) (3.7212) 
13 Buy 
0.0022  0.0032 0.0034 0.0034 0.0033 
(1.7800)  (2.8363) (3.1544) (3.2221) (3.3945) 
13 Sell 
-0.0016  -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0001 
(-0.9600)  (-1.3502) (-0.9738) (-0.4948) (-0.0540) 
13 Buy-Sell 
0.0038  0.0055 0.0048 0.0040 0.0034 





Table 2:  Betas and Market Capitalization of Relative Strength Portfolios 
London Stock Exchange 1866-1907 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in 
ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past 
return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is the buy portfolio. The 
remaining are assigned in the middle portfolio. 
              
  
CAPM Beta 
Average Market Cap 
   (million pounds) 
Buy 1.171 13.369 
Middle 1/3  0.735  19.409 
Sell 1.195 12.437 













Table 3:  Monthly  Returns  of  Size-based  and  Beta-based  Relative Strength  Portfolios  
London Stock Exchange 1866-1907 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio and A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return 
is the buy portfolio. The remaining are assigned in the middle portfolio. Average monthly returns and excess returns of these portfolios and the returns of the relative strength 
portfolios formed using size-based and beta-based subsamples of securities are reported here. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds. Panel A reports average returns. 
Panel B reports Jensen's CAPM alphas. And, Panel C reports CAPM regressions augmented with a NBER Business Cycle dummy. 
 
              
Past Returns  All  Small  Medium  Large 
Panel A: Size-sorted  Average  returns  and  t-stats 
Buy  0.0026 0.0014 0.0034 0.0024 
(2.3060) (0.7968) (2.7908) (2.0136) 
Middle  0.0020 -0.0018 0.0006 0.0021 
(3.0078) (-1.042) (0.4981) (3.1300) 
Sell  -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0007 
(-0.6817) (-1.0100) (-1.4414) (-0.5188) 
Buy-Sell  0.0034 0.0033 0.0053 0.0031 
(2.9693) (2.7130) (6.0779) (2.4098) 
              
Panel B: Excess  returns  (Jensen's  CAPM  alphas) 
Buy  -0.0040 -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0044 
(-5.0428)  (-1.5862)      (-1.1498)      (-4.9347) 
Middle  -0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0032 -0.0029 
(-6.6399) (-2.8756) (-2.6764) (-6.6667) 
Sell  -0.0075 -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0075 
(-8.1057) (-3.7656)  (-6.241)  (-7.486) 
Buy-Sell 
0.0035 0.0043 0.0061 0.0031 
(2.9840) (3.4295) (6.8496) (2.3639) 
 
Table  continued  on  next  page  ... 40 
 
Table   3  Continued  
 
 
                          
Panel C: Jensen Alphas with Market and NBER Business Cycle Dummy 
Past  Returns  All  Small Medium Large     All  Small Medium Large 
Jensen Alphas  Beta on NBER Business Cycle Dummy 
(Dummy=1 if recession) 
Buy 
-0.0041 -0.001 -0.0002  -0.0046  0.0002 -0.0036 -0.0023 0.0004 
(-3.6934) (-0.3983) (-0.1022) (-3.6858)  (0.1573) (-1.0369) (-1.0167) (0.2553) 
Middle 
-0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0019 -0.0028  -0.0003 -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0002 
(-4.4469) (-1.4656) (-1.1618) (-4.5684)  (-0.3852) (-0.8222) (-1.0538) (-0.2391) 
Sell 
-0.0074 -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0077  -0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0052 0.0003 
(-5.6204) (-2.2076) (-2.8974) (-5.4264)  (-0.1968) (-0.6662) (-2.2123) (0.1533) 
Buy-Sell 
0.0032 0.0048 0.0047 0.0031  6.08E-04 -0.0011  0.0028 1.44E-04 







Table 4:  Sensitivity to treatment of exit firms  -  CAPM  Alphas 
 
In this table we relax the assumption that extinct stocks have -99.99 % return. The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-
month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio and A value-weighted portfolio of 
stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is the buy portfolio. The remaining are assigned in the middle portfolio. Average 
monthly returns and excess returns of these portfolios and the returns of the relative strength portfolios formed using size-based 
and beta-based subsamples of securities are reported here. Size is sorted in lower, middle and highest thirds. 
           
   Small  Medium  Large 
Panel A: Exit firms set at -99.99% 
Buy  -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0044 
(-1.5862) (-1.1498) (-4.9347) 
Middle  -0.0052 -0.0032 -0.0029 
(-2.8756) (-2.6764)    (-6.6667) 
Sell  -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0075 
(-3.7656) (-6.241)  (-7.486) 
Buy-Sell  0.0043 0.0061 0.0031 
(3.4295) (6.8496) (2.3639) 
           
Panel B: Exit firms not set at -99.99% 
Buy  0.0024 0.0025 -0.0011 
(2.4802) (4.6837) (-2.3061) 
Middle  0.0012 0.0008 -0.001 
(2.1281) (2.1064) (-3.8416) 
Sell 
-0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0048 
(-1.3781) (-5.0422) (-8.3276) 
Buy-Sell 
0.0038 0.0059 0.0037 








Table 5: Monthly Returns on Size-based Relative Strength Portfolio by 
Calendar Months. London Stock Exchange 1866-1907   
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in 
ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past 
return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is the buy portfolio. 
Returns are 28-day, not monthly. January returns are coded as the first 28-day return entirely in the new year. P-value shows that 
the result of t-test on the null of equality with Jan. 
              
Month All  Small  Med  Large 
Panel A: Return on Loser, Middle, and Winner Portfolio 
Return  on  6-6  portfolios:  Losers 
Jan  0.0020 0.0080 0.0039 0.0017 
Feb-Dec  -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0008 
p-value  0.5300 0.1400 0.2200 0.6100 
Return  on  6-6  portfolios:  Middle 
Jan  0.0103 0.0096 0.0094 0.0105 
Feb-Dec  0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0001 0.0015 
p-value  0.0000 0.0700 0.0400 0.0000 
Return  on  6-6  portfolios:  Winners 
Jan  0.0082 0.0087 0.0132 0.0076 
Feb-Dec  0.0024 0.0008 0.0027 0.0023 
p-value  0.1700 0.2500 0.0300 0.2400 
              
Panel B: Return on Winner - Loser Portfolio 
Jan  0.0063 0.0005 0.0095 0.0060 
(2.3922) (0.1770) (4.3477) (2.0312) 
Feb-Dec  0.0032 0.0035 0.0050 0.0029 
(2.5891) (2.7262) (5.3517) (2.0833) 




Table 6:  Sensitivity to treatment of exit firms  -  Average returns 
 
We relaxed our assumptions by either ignoring the extinction (don't set the last return to -99.99%) or ignoring all missing data by 
assuming it is missing completely at random (MCAR) and computing results from observable data only. The relative strength 
portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 
6-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio and A 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is the buy portfolio. The remaining are assigned in 
the middle portfolio. Average monthly returns and excess returns of these portfolios and the returns of the relative strength 
portfolios formed using size-based and beta-based subsamples of securities are reported here. Size is sorted in lower, middle and 
highest thirds. 
           
Size    MCAR  Not set at -99.99%  Set at -99.99% 
Panel A: Size-sorted  Average  monthly  returns 
Small  0.0031   0.0028   0.0033  
(3.0173) (2.8179) (2.7130) 
Medium  0.0049   0.0049   0.0053  
(6.6676) (6.8329) (6.0779) 
Large 
0.0034   0.0034   0.0031  
(3.9647) (4.0896) (2.4098) 
Panel B: Excess  returns (Jensen's  CAPM  alphas) 
Small  0.0040   0.0037   0.0043  
(4.0116) (3.7387) (3.4295) 
Medium  0.0058   0.0059   0.0061  
(8.1034) (8.2087) (6.8496) 
Large 
0.0037   0.0037   0.0031  





Table 7:  Monthly Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios - Long horizons 
London Stock Exchange 1866-1907 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed on J-month lagged returns and held for K months. The values of J and K for the 
different strategies are indicated in the first column and row respectively. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 
J-month lagged returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is the buy portfolio. t-statistics are between 
parentheses. As noted at the beginning of section 2, we considered 28-day periods as months in our calculations. Moreover, when 
considering a year, i.e. K = 12 in Jegadeesh and Titman, we used 13 28-day periods. It is important to note that the results are 
computed from all available time periods. This means the sample periods vary by column. For example the portfolio return in 
year 2 after formation is computed by looking at the buy-sell portfolio 14-26 months after formation, so our first “year 2” 
observation is July 1867-June 1868. Our first “year 5” observation doesn't begin until July 1871, however. Therefore the Year 2 
column has more observations then the Year 5 column. This is also why the various columns do not add up. 
                       
J 
K 
   Year  2  Year  3  Year  4  Year  5  Year  2-5  Year  3-5 
3 Buy 
0.0028 0.0028 0.0026 0.0019 0.0025 0.0024 
(3.4085) (3.4459) (3.2127) (1.8392) (3.1330) (2.9863) 
3 Sell  0.0018 0.0024 0.0028 0.0031 0.0022 0.0027 
(1.9838) (2.6039) (3.1467) (3.5481) (2.4413) (3.1020) 
3 Buy-sell  0.001  0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0004 -0.0003 
(2.2551) (0.8765) (-0.4505) (-1.6807) (1.1792) (-1.0119) 
6 Buy  0.0032 0.0032 0.0026  0.002  0.0028 0.0027 
(3.9071) (4.1021) (3.0710) (2.2091) (3.4553) (3.3621) 
6 Sell  0.0015 0.0022 0.0033 0.0034 0.0022 0.0029 
(1.4816) (2.1186) (3.3508) (3.4622) (2.2689) (2.9919) 
6 Buy-sell 0.0017 0.001 -0.0006  -0.0014  0.0006  -0.0002 
(2.6502) (1.4971) (-1.0493) (-2.1428) (1.1576) (-0.3828) 
9 Buy  0.0033  0.003  0.0022 0.0021 0.0026 0.0025 
(3.8523) (3.5455) (2.4311) (2.2850) (3.1731) (2.9911) 
9 Sell  0.0016 0.0027 0.0035 0.0034 0.0025 0.0032 
(1.6110) (2.5483) (3.4945) (3.1871) (2.5406) (3.3295) 
9 Buy-sell 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0008 
(2.1863) (0.3738) (-1.8331) (-1.6262) (0.1324) (-1.4513) 
13 Buy  0.0035 0.0029 0.0018 0.0022 0.0026 0.0023 
(4.0243) (3.4390) (1.8966) (2.2931) (3.1640) (2.6976) 
13 Sell  0.0019  0.0027 0.004 0.0033  0.0029  0.0035 
(1.7501) (2.5532) (3.7176) (2.8022) (2.7927) (3.4251) 
13 Buy-sell 
0.0016  0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0012 




Table 8: Reversal Equality Tests 
 
We  form  a           matrix      where      ,    is  the  holding  period  return  from  month       12   to  month     on the 
winner minus loser portfolio formed       13 “months” earlier. Let X   ,          ,   1          ,1  . The entries to the table 
report the mean return of the winner minus loser portfolios 1 through 5 years after formation. We test of the null that 
   X   ,        0           via a Wald test                 with       ∑  X   ,1   /    ,…,∑  X   ,4   /      and        is 
estimated using the Newey-West procedure with 13 lags. The test statistic is under the null   ~    4 , asymptotically. 
 
Panel A: Average  monthly  return  in year N after formation 
1 2 3 4 5 
0.0034 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0006  -0.0015 
Panel B: Wald  test  that  average monthly  return is  equal  in  years  1  through  5 
   W-stat    p-value    
   35.14     0.00    
Panel C: P-values  for  Wald  test  that  average monthly  return  in  N  years  after formation  =  
average monthly  return  J  years after  formation  for  any  N,  J 
J  N 
1 2  3  4  5 
1  - 
2  0 - 
3  0 0.16  - 
4  0 0.02  0.12  - 










Table 9:  Momentum Profits and Market States   
The Table reports evidence on market states and momentum pro t similar to CGH (2004). At the beginning of each month t, all 
stocks are allocated into deciles based on their lagged six-month returns (from   5  to   1 ; skipping month  ). Down, Avg and 
Up markets were defined as follows Up = market index return over past 3 years in top 1/3 of sample Avg = market index return 
over past 3 years in middle 1/3 of sample Down = market index return over past 3 years in Bottom 1/3 of sample. Profits of the 
momentum portfolios (winner minus loser deciles) are cumulated across holding period months t + 1 to t + 6: Reported below are 
the mean monthly profits and CAPM alphas. 
 
     
   CRSP  Data  1929-1995  London  Data  1869-1907 
Panel A: Monthly  returns  following  36  month  UP-Markets  (85  %  of  observed  states) 
Mean  Ret  0.0040 0.0038 
(3.8000) (4.4555) 
CAPM  alpha  0.0053 0.0039 
(4.8913) (4.5414) 
        
Panel B: Monthly  returns  following  36  month  Down-Markets  (15  %  of  observed  states) 
Mean  Ret  -0.0028 0.0015 
(-1.1061) (0.7713) 
CAPM  alpha  -0.0002 0.0016 
(-0.0971) (0.8158) 
        
Panel C: Test  for  equality  Up = Down 
t-stat:  Mean  Ret  2.5055  1.0474 





Table 10:  Factor-Model Predicted Monthly Returns and Momentum 
     London  Stock  Exchange  1866-1907 
 
All  stocks  are  first  sorted  each  month  t  into  quintiles  based  on  their  six-month  (t-5  to  t)  predicted  returns  from  the  four-factor  model: 
 
                                                   
 
where excess return on market portfolio, Divyld: lagged dividend yield on market index, Term: lagged term spread (yield on British consol - yield on 30day bankbill), 
and Default: lagged default yield (yield on risky bonds (brit RR) - yield on British consol). This table employs the nonoverlapping-return method used by CS (2002). In 
Panel A, F-stat shows f-statistic on the null that               0  and    is for the regression of CAPM residuals on       ,    ,  and         . Panel B reports 
sorts based on predicted returns of the four factor model.  
                                   
Panel A: Regression Results 
Sell Mid  Buy 
   Small  Med  Large     Small  Med  Large     Small  Med  Large 
   
0.2964 -0.1459  0.174  0.0688 0.1374 -0.0584  0.018  0.0676 0.0562 
(0.8799) (-0.6828) (0.9542)  (0.2115) (0.6439) (-0.7423)  (0.0568)  (0.3213) (0.3479) 
   
0.3009 0.1767 -0.2143  0.4298 0.1904 0.1913  0.1549  0.3812 -0.0572 
(0.6824) (0.6315) (-0.8977)  (1.0088) (0.6817) (1.8565)  (0.3722)  (1.3838) (-0.2707) 
   
0.5088 0.3196 0.0919  0.2999 0.3726 0.0705  0.4165  0.2669 -0.0412 
(3.0051) (2.9753) (1.0031)  (1.8330) (3.4753) (1.7812)  (2.6067)  (2.5231) (-0.5078) 
F-stat  4.3343 3.7500 0.5343  2.1365 5.1524 2.9292  2.6002  4.0728 0.1689 
p-value  0.0050 0.0110 0.6590  0.0947 0.0016 0.0332  0.0515  0.0071 0.9174 













Table 10 Continued  
 
                    
Panel B: Chordia  and  Shivakumar  (2002)  predicted  returns  sort 
Momentum  Sorts:  Sell  Med  Buy  Buy-Sell 
E[R]  low  0.001  0.0028 0.0031 0.0021 
(0.6279) (3.4371) (2.1358) (1.2509) 
Factor  sorts:  E[R]  med  0.001 0.0026 0.002  0.001 
(1.0013) (3.9661) (1.9003) (0.9976) 
E[R]  high  -0.0015 0.0013 0.0039 0.0054 
(-0.9799) (1.4754) (3.0703) (3.7516) 
high-low 
-0.0025 -0.0015 0.0008 
      (-1.6382)  (-1.7748)  (0.5686)    49 
 
Table 11:  Momentum Profits and the Economy 
London Stock Exchange 1866-1907 
 
The Table reports evidence on momentum profits and the state of the economy, in particular the results of the regression:  
 
                   
 
where r is annual the return on the 6-6 buy portfolio minus the return on the 6-6 sell portfolio and GDP is the demeaned real per 
capita GDP growth. Note that in this table we examine annual returns - not monthly - as GDP is only available at an annual 
frequency. 
              
Size             .  
Small 
0.0610 -0.3510 -0.8704 
0.1 
(3.4017) (-1.6974) (-1.2196) 
Med 
0.078 -0.1771  -0.4754 
0.03 
(5.9050) (-1.1626) (-0.9044) 
Large 
0.0321 0.1554 -0.803 
0.01 


















Table 12:  Correlations among series 
 
The table displays full sample estimates of the correlations computed at an annual frequency between (1) returns on buy-sell small stock portfolio, (2) buy-sell medium portfolio, 
(3) buy-sell large stock portfolio, (4) average cross-sectional monthly standard deviation, (5) excess returns            , (6) growth of real GDP per capita, (7) short term rate 
(Ordinary funds), and (8) long term rate. 
                                  
Avg. Short 
Buy-Sell Buy-Sell Buy-Sell  cross-sect  Excess  Growth  Term  rate  Long 
small med large  monthly  Return rgdp/pc  Ordinary  term 
              s.d.        funds  rate 
Buy-Sell small  1 
Buy-Sell med  0.02 1 
Buy-Sell large  0.14 0.1  1 
Avg.  cross-sect monthly s.d.  0.17 0.12 0.15  1 
Excess Return  -0.33 -0.24 0.08  0.09  1 
Growth rgdp/pc  -0.28 -0.21 -0.19  -0.15 0.33  1 
Short  term  rate Ordinary  funds  0.16 0 0.13  -0.23  -0.41  -0.03  1 
Long  term  rate    -0.35 0.36  0.1  -0.05 0.02 -0.06  0.33  1 51 
 
Table 13: Autocorrelation Estimates 
 
We estimate the autocorrelations of momentum profits for the Victorian and CRSP eras. The T-stat column represents the t-
statistics of the estimate under the null that all autocorrelations are zero. 
                    
   Victorian Era  CRSP Era 
    Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Panel A : Monthly Data 
    -0.0534 -1.2410 0.0755 2.3697 
    -0.1217 -2.8282 -0.0919 -2.8832 
    -0.0477 -1.1081 -0.1019 -3.1959 
    -0.0429 -0.9970 -0.0174 -0.5453 
    0.0092 0.2133 -0.0191 -0.5991 
    0.0095     0.2218  0.0944     2.9619 
Panel B : Quarterly Data 
    -0.1715 -2.3004 -0.1119 -2.0264 
    0.1550 2.0791 0.0805 1.4576 
    -0.0733 -1.0373 -0.0892 -1.6163 
    0.1140     1.5293  0.0410     0.7424 
 
 
Table 14: Tests on the Autocorrelation Feature 
 
Each entry is p-value. Ljung-Box test is the test on the null that all autocorrelations are zero. We can  reject the null except for the 
monthly data of the Victorian era. Box-Pierce test is the test on the null that autocorrelations are same for both Victorian and 
CRSP eras. P-values show that we cannot reject the null for both monthly and quarterly data.  
   Victorian Era  CRSP Era 
Panel A : Monthly Data 
Ljung-Box test  0.0526  0.0000 
Box-Pierce test  0.1142 
Panel B : Quarterly Data 
Ljung-Box test  0.0099  0.0462 





Table 15: Empirical Distribution of Duration Up and Down Momentum 
Cycles 
 
Entries feature a comparison of up and down momentum duration cycles for the CRSP and Victorian eras. Entries feature a 
comparison of up and down momentum duration cycles for the CRSP and Victorian eras. All cycles are computed from the 
returns of the Lag-6, Hold-6 WML momentum portfolio. A duration spell is a period of consecutive gains or losses. An Up cycle 
begins when a positive return follows a negative return and continues until the next negative return. A down cycle begins when a 





Panel A : Up Cycles 
Duration Spells  Victorian Era  CRSP Era 
1 0.35  0.33 
2 0.26  0.22 
3 0.16  0.19 
4 0.09  0.10 
5 0.08  0.08 
6 and more  0.06  0.08 
Panel B : Down Cycles 
Duration Spells  Victorian Era  CRSP Era 
1 0.61  0.58 
2 0.27  0.26 
3 0.05  0.07 
4 0.05  0.06 
5 0.02  0.02 
6 and more  0.00  0.00 





















Table 16:  Nonparametric Tests of Duration Spells 
 
Duration spells of up and down momentum cycles are tested for equality across the Victorian and CRSP eras. The test statistics 
are: are  (a) the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test, (b) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, (c) Cramer-von Mises test, and (d) Kuiper test 
Entries to the table are p-values for the null hypothesis that the duration spells during the Victorian and CRSP eras are drawn 
from the same population.  
                 
Panel A : Up Cycles 
Duration Spells  1 2 3 4 6 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon  0.30 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.00 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  0.90 0.79 0.31 0.34 0.08 
Cramer-von Mises  0.16 0.19 0.41 0.13 0.94 
Kuiper  0.99 0.99 0.86 0.64 0.32 
Panel B : Down Cycles 
Duration Spells  1 2 3 4 6 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon  0.30 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.57 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  0.70 0.48 0.14 0.87 0.92 
Cramer-von Mises  0.23 0.49 0.16 0.18 0.10 
Kuiper  0.82 0.94 0.41 0.94 0.92 
                 54 
 
Table 17:  Duration Spells – Parametric Estimates 
 
We estimate parameters of Exponential distribution, Gamma distribution and Weibull distributions using Maximum Likelihood.  
The density function of the exponential distribution is              , the Gamma distribution is       
            
Г    , and that of 
the Weibull distribution is                             
.  
Distributional  
Assumption  Parameters 
Victorian Era  CRSP Era 
MLE t-stat MLE t-stat 
Panel A : Up Cycles 
Exponential  λ  0.4030 11.5143 0.3696 14.9636 
Gamma 
λ  1.0985 7.8241 0.9352  10.1652 
κ  2.7255 8.5870 2.5301  11.2349 
Weibull 
λ  0.3571 18.2194 0.3290 22.3810 
p  1.6730 15.3768 1.5860 20.3856 
Panel B : Down Cycles 
Exponential  λ  0.6346 11.4964 0.5958 14.9698 
Gamma 
λ  2.7447 7.9441 2.2371  10.3522 
κ  4.3250 8.4275 3.7551  11.0737 
Weibull 
λ  0.5583 20.6778 0.5247 25.2260 




Table 18: The Effect of State Variables on the Duration Spells 
 
We test the effect of state variables on the duration spells. First, we apply 3 month moving average filter to all variables first. Then, remove durations which are less than or equal 
to 3. With those filtered data, we test the effect of state variables on the duration spells. We set   e x p                            . We use     as the average risk free rate minus  
the inflation rate of the last year of the beginning of the duration, assuming the inflation rate of last year is the expected inflation rate.        is the average stock market return for 
the last three years. As predicted the point estimate on the risk-free rate has a positive effect on the duration of up cycles and a negative effect on the duration of down cycles. 
Regardless of specification the point estimates are always the predicted sign but often insignificant from zero. 
                          
Distributional  
Assumption  Parameters 
   Victorian Era     CRSP Era 
MLE s.e.  t-stat      MLE  s.e.  t-stat 
Panel A : Up Cycles 
Gamma 
    0.2923 0.3252 0.8988  0.2004 0.1878  1.0671 
    40.2349 47.1920  0.8526  36.2294 17.6612 2.0514 
    -0.2851 0.6823  -0.4179  -0.0419 0.1499  -0.2795 
κ  5.6320 1.3275 4.2426  6.0021 1.0096  5.9450 
Weibull 
    2.1146 0.2337 9.0484  2.1174 0.0926  22.8661 
    75.7509 43.3978  1.7455  34.1785 20.0536 1.7044 
    -0.4543 0.7842  -0.5793  -0.0427 0.1692  -0.2524 
p  2.3417 0.2946 7.9487  2.3697 0.2059  11.5090    
Panel B : Down Cycles 
Gamma 
    -0.4157 0.5012  -0.8294  -0.4929 0.2688  -1.8337 
    -101.0582 59.7824 -1.6904  -19.1313 21.7347 -0.8802 
    -1.3545 0.6565  -2.0632  0.0322 0.1378  0.2337 
κ  16.1790 6.3200 2.5600  9.2884 2.3967  3.8755 
Weibull 
    2.7569 0.3105 8.8789  1.8576 0.0811  22.9051 
    -145.4752 55.6524 -2.6140  -33.0879 24.6850 -1.3404 
    -1.9172 0.6154  -3.1154  0.0320 0.1478  0.2165 
p     4.4620     0.9786     4.5596        2.9876     0.4095     7.2957    
                                            56 
 
 
Table 19: The Difference of the Effect of State Variables on the Duration Spells across up/down Cycles 
 
We use the same smoothing as in Table 18. The null hypothesis is that the level of the risk-free rate differs across UP and DOWN cycles. We test this hypothesis by pooling the 
UP and Down cycles and estimating allowing the all coefficients to vary with an interaction dummy equal to one if the observation is a down cycle. Formally, we set   
exp                                        ,       ,          ,           where             is 1 if the cycle is down or 0 otherwise. In the same way, κ  and p are 
adjusted. Regardless of era or specification, the effect of the risk-free rate is always significantly lower in DOWN cycles. 
                          
Distributional  
Assumption  Parameters 
   Victorian Era     CRSP Era 
   MLE  s.e.  t-stat     MLE  s.e.  t-stat 
Gamma 
    0.2923 0.3208 0.9112  0.2004 0.1878  1.0671 
  ,    -0.7079 0.5815  -1.2174  -0.6933 0.3278  -2.1150 
    40.2349 41.2217  0.9761  36.2294 18.7357  1.9337 
  ,    -141.293 63.6805 -2.2188  -55.3607 28.1399 -1.9673 
    -0.2851 0.6822  -0.4179  -0.0419 0.1499  -0.2795 
  ,    -1.0694 0.9387  -1.1392  0.0741 0.2035  0.3641 
κ  5.632 1.3274 4.2429  6.0021 1.0096  5.9450 
κ_dd  10.547 6.3601 1.6583  3.2862 2.5999  1.2640 
Weibull 
    2.1146 0.234  9.0368  2.1174  0.0926  22.8661 
  ,    0.6423 0.3771 1.7033  -0.2598 0.1231  -2.1105 
    75.751 43.5596  1.7390  34.1784 20.6532  1.6549 
  ,    -221.2262 67.9522 -3.2556  -67.2663  31.596 -2.1289 
    -0.4543 0.7839  -0.5795  -0.0427 0.1692  -0.2524 
  ,    -1.4629 0.9843  -1.4862  0.0747 0.2245  0.3327 
p  2.3417 0.2946 7.9487  2.3697 0.2059  11.5090 
p_dd     2.1203     1.0187     2.0814        0.618     0.458     1.3493    
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Table 20: Momentum Portfolio Turnover: Transition Probability Matrix 
The turnover of the relative strength portfolios is measured via a transition probability matrix for the K=6/J=6  strategy. The diagonal elements are of most interest as they reveal 
what fraction of stocks remain in the portfolio. 
 
Probability of  being  in 
Portfolio at time  t+6 
Portfolio  at  time  t 
Size  Small Med Large  Small Med Large  Small Med Large 
Momentum  Sell Sell Sell Med  Med  Med Buy Buy Buy 
Small Sell  0.345 0.051 0.000 0.282 0.023 0.000 0.322 0.033 0.000 
Med  Sell  0.008 0.296 0.032 0.008 0.207 0.014 0.010 0.232 0.019 
Large Sell  0.000 0.009 0.306 0.001 0.007 0.211 0.000 0.008 0.243 
Small Med  0.202 0.008 0.000 0.281 0.009 0.000 0.212 0.009 0.000 
Med  Med  0.011 0.224 0.009 0.018 0.354 0.012 0.013 0.276 0.012 
Large Med  0.000 0.017 0.310 0.000 0.026 0.452 0.000 0.014 0.336 
Small Buy  0.282 0.006 0.000 0.256 0.005 0.000 0.301 0.005 0.000 
Med  Buy  0.039 0.279 0.005 0.036 0.263 0.005 0.045 0.308 0.006 
Large Buy  0.000 0.031 0.279 0.000 0.027 0.246 0.000 0.035 0.321 






Table 21:  Bid-Ask  Spread  Statistics 
 
The relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged returns and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged returns. A 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th percentile past return is 
the buy portfolio. Value weighted average of the Bid-Ask spread of each security that is added or removed from the portfolio at time t, where Bid-Ask Spread = (Ask-
Bid)/[average(bid,ask)] 
 
                                
Sell Mid Buy 
Small Med Large      Small Med Large      Small Med Large 
Prob  of  remaining  in  portfolio 
0.345 0.296 0.306      0.281 0.354 0.452      0.301 0.308 0.321 
Bid-ask  spread  of  those  traded 
0.21 0.09 0.03      0.14 0.06 0.02      0.15 0.07 0.02 
Percentage of  “new”  stocks  in  new  portfolio 
0.655 0.704 0.694      0.719 0.646 0.548      0.699 0.692 0.679 
Per  period  Bid-Ask  cost  trading  cost 
0.0229 0.0106 0.0035      0.0168 0.0065 0.0018      0.0175 0.0081 0.0023 
Per  period  costs  in  basis  points 






Figure  1:  Momentum  Profit  Cycles 
 
The figure displays the time series of the Fama-French momentum factor returns from 1946 to 2008 and the momentum factor returns during the Victorian era. 
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Figure  2:  Number  of  Stocks  in  Portfolios 
 
This study makes use of a new data set of 1,808 stocks (equity) listed in London between 1866 and 1907. The plots display the number of stocks, which decline to 985 in 1903 







Figure  3:  Five-Year  Rolling  Average  Returns  on  Size-based  Relative  Strength  Portfolios 
 
We report the average monthly excess return on the momentum portfolios during each of the five years following portfolio formation, after skipping a month. The 
relative strength portfolios are formed on a 6-month lagged return and held for 6 months. The stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of 6-month lagged 
returns. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest 33rd percentile past return is the sell portfolio. A value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest 67th 



























Figure 7:  Empirical and Parametric distribution of duration down
 
 